Afghanistan and Beyond — Playing With the Big Boys

While the com­par­ison is fre­quently ban­died around in the press Afgh­anistan is look­ing more and more like Vietnam.

Saigon Chopper

For bet­ter or worse Bri­tain is stuck for the fore­see­able in a part of the world where few out­siders have had mil­it­ary suc­cess. Amer­ica had more heli­copters than you can shake a oily mon­key wrench at dur­ing their ill fated exploits in South East Asia yet what good did it do them? None, bar the endur­ing image of that last chop­per leav­ing the roof of a Sai­gon com­pound. A war fought on dubi­ous grounds increas­ingly lack­ing in pop­u­lar sup­port against an insur­gent force, sound famil­iar? So what to do? Increase the size of the army James For­syth argues in the Spec­tator. The States had over half a mil­lion men in a sig­ni­fic­antly smal­ler coun­try, again, I ask what good did that do them? To put it into per­spect­ive, if the US gen­er­als get their anti­cip­ated troop rein­force­ments they will have just shy of 100,000. Bri­tain does not need a big­ger army. The men and equip­ment neces­sary to oper­ate prop­erly are required but what Bri­tain needs is a coher­ent exit strategy from a bloody and point­less conflict.

The only way for us to get out of Afgh­anistan is through a nego­ti­ated set­tle­ment with the tribes, insur­gents and Afghan gov­ern­ment. A multi-national force could provide a safe buf­fer zone to pro­tect as much of the bor­der with Pakistan as they can but that’s it. It is at this point when Bri­tain needs to take a good look at itself in the mir­ror. We, as much as it pains us to admit it, are not a major world player. We are a small to medium sized coun­try linger­ing on the out­skirts of Europe. We need to for­get our colo­nial past. Yes, we have brought many won­der­ful things to the world — cricket, golf and rugby to name but three — but we need to grow up. You don’t see Greece, Italy (well not ser­i­ously), Tunisia or Bel­ize claim­ing any divine right to inter­vene where they are not wanted. We need to start behav­ing like coun­tries of a sim­ilar size — yes, main­tain a small, pro­fes­sional, well armed and trained defence force but do we need space aged nukes? Not really. By all means we can join multi-national mil­it­ary ven­tures but let’s leave the global poli­cing to the big boys.

2 Comments

  • Totally agree that we are, sadly, a small player no &, impli­citly, our involve­ment is the price of the poker chips to the big boys game. Undeni­able. But.

    We are where we are. We can nego­ti­ate with some play­ers to dis­en­gage; iron­ic­ally because we are small fry the tribes & local gov­ern­ment may be OK but the Taliban & US may not. How do we handle that? Of course that may be sol­uble with polit­ical nerve effort. My fear is that the price of exit may be higher than the price of entry.

    Viet­nam com­par­is­ons are attract­ive, and I hate the waste of Brit Squad­dies as much as you. I sug­gest this as lightly as I can these are per­haps veer­ing to the simplistic. I’d tend to think (per­haps a bit Gung-Ho) that a mod­ern tech­no­lo­gical West­ern Army with the kit, the man­power and the polit­ical & social will *could* beat the Taliban, not­with­stand­ing his­tory. Unlike invest­ments the past mil­it­ary per­form­ance doesn’t neces­sar­ily indic­ate future per­form­ance. that said we don’t have any of that: quite rightly too in this case.

    So I agree with the sen­ti­ment but I don’t see any solu­tion that isn’t embar­rass­ing and I don’t yet think we are in a pos­i­tion to take whatever defeat the Taliban wishes to impose on us. That will take more Brit­ish lives.

  • I think the key to this is: ‘with the polit­ical and social will’ Both are being lost rap­idly. I don’t advoc­ate a with­drawal until we are in a pos­i­tion to nego­ti­ate on stronger terms but I do think in the long term it is the only answer. At the height of the Troubles in North­ern Ire­land we had 22,000 troops in the province. In the end the IRA were infilt­rated so thor­oughly by our intel­li­gence ser­vice they vir­tu­ally imploded — we still had to nego­ti­ate though. In Afgh­anistan we have no real hope of hav­ing the same levels of infilt­ra­tion. The AQ/Taliban weak­ness that we did not cap­it­al­ise on in Afgh­anistan and Iraq was and is their depend­ence on tri­bal loy­al­ties. They are the only viable altern­at­ive to fill the power the vacuum.

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